workflow_pwn_request

Do not check out PR code in a pull_request_target workflow medium effort

# Bad: pull_request_target + checkout of untrusted PR ref
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  build:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@<sha>
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}   # UNTRUSTED

# Fix: use pull_request (runs in fork context without secrets),
# or split the workflow so pull_request_target only labels/comments.

Documentation →

Suppress a confirmed non-issue with a committed .pullguardignore entry (pullguard ignore locally, or comment /pullguard ignore <fingerprint> <reason> on the PR — the fingerprint is printed in the PR comment’s Triage section). Entries support expiresAt for time-boxed snoozes.

Security findings at major or critical severity — and any critical finding — always surface: .pullguardignore cannot hide them. The reviewed paths that keep them visible are acknowledged (reviewed, stays in reports) and, for a confirmed false positive, a reasoned false_positive entry — visible and audited, excluded only from the merge block.